

TING I ET UDVIDET FELT

Lars Kiel Bertelsen

"SAMLERENS TILVÆRELSE FR DIALEKTISK UDSPÆNDT MELLE
ORDENENS OG UORDENENS POLER"

Walter Benjamin, "Jeg pakker mit bibliotek ud"

TING står ofte i vejen. De er ligesom strøet ud foran os i lighed med potentielt fatale asteroider, der truen de krydser det autonome subjekts planetare bane (det latinske *objectum* betyder egentlig 'udkastet'). Vi snubler over dem, vi støder ind i dem. På den måde bliver vores krop opmærksom på, at den selv er en ting i verden, hvorved forestillingen om ren, friktionsløs, viljebaseret, abstrakt fremdrift (privatbilismens, aeronautikkens og rumfartens fælles mytologi) afsløres som en – muligvis særligt maskulint kønnet – illusion. På den måde minder ting og skulpturer om hinanden, og tingene opfører sig jævnthen 'feminint'

skulpturelt på samme måde som Barnett Newman beskrev det i 1950'erne, da han sagde at "skulpturen er det du støder ind i, når du træder to skridt tilbage for at se på et maleri." Man(d) støder altså ind i de 'kvindelige' ting, og hos nogle bliver omgangen med ting en besættelse; som hos samleren, hvis systematiske, ja perverterede eksklusivitet hvad angår det attråede begærsubjekt sagtens tåler sammenligning med kønsdriftens mere aparte udtryksformer, hvilket netop antyder en intim sammenhæng mellem de to.

Museer er naturligvis det sted i kulturen, hvor denne *tingenes fetishkult* dyrkes med den største kraft, og samtidig det sted i kultu-


THE PICCADILLY LINE

ren, hvor selvsamme fetishisme fornægtes med største eftertryk. Offentlige museer er således magtfulde statsligt regulerede institutioner, der med omfattende økonomisk, juridisk og organisatorisk understøttelse har til formål at indsamle og udstille *ting*. De har også mange andre formål, fx forskning og formidling, men disse formål er sekundære, for så vidt de ikke kunne finde sted uden tingene som deres, ja netop, *genstand*. Altså tingene som både mål og middel for forskningen og formidlingen. I denne cirkelslutende, selvbekræftende bevægelse bliver tingene til, idet de beskrives; de begrundes, idet de navngives; de values, idet de tilskrives proveniens. Museet er til for tingene, ligesom tingene er til for museet, og et af avantgardens hovedprojekter har – lige siden futuristen Marinetti i 1909 foreslog at rive museerne ned – været at undslippe denne tryllecirkel.

Museernes manøvre kan naturligvis kun lade sig gøre, for så vidt de indsamlede ting har eller kan tilskrives kulturel værdi, sådan som det gælder for både kunstværker og arkæologiske fund (danefæ), naturvidenskabelige artefakter ('danekræ') og andre typer af ting, der kan indskrives i kulturelt anerkendte, naturaliserede skemaer, f.eks. forestillinger om almen dannelse, national bevidsthed eller historisk viden, som alt sammen uden videre diskussion er 'godt'. Det gælder omvendt de færreste privatsamlinger, hvis afgrænsninger (kuglepenne, engangslightere, frimærker, colaflasker...) ikke på samme måde lader sig indskrive i den slags ubetvivlelige skemaer for almen nytte. Og selv om mange privatsamlere med aspirationer om at netop

deres uvurderlige samling skal høste anerkendelse påberåber sig den slags almennytte ('et stykke Danmarkshistorie fortalt i havregrynspakker'), så er det formodentlig netop hér, vi ser forskellen mellem den ægte privatsamling og den offentlige samling markere sig.

Den ægte privatsamlings inderste logik, dens mest intime begrundelse, er en rå fetishisme, et haptisk begær efter at berøre og håndtere de kraftfulde ting – tilsyneladende uden anden begrundelse end tingene selv,



hvorfor der da også hviler en sær, masturbatorisk, ensom skæbne over privatsamleren (udtrykt i klichéen om frimærkesamlerens håbløse scorereplik), der lukker sig om sit eget håndarbejde med tingene i afsidesliggende, beklumrede rum, med hænderne nede i kufferter, kasser, arkivbokse, hæfter og montrer. På den baggrund kan man hævde, at privatsamlingen ophører med at være privatsamling i samme øjeblik dens ejermand (for samlere er oftest mænd) ønsker at udstille eller blot fremvise samlingen, fordi fetishismen da erstattes af en ekshibitionisme,

der forskyder begæret fra den autoerotiske håndtering af tingen til den sociale udveksling af dens kulturelle bytteværdi. Men så længe samlingen er en ægte privatsamling, bliver vi i kælderens. I disse formørkede miljøer rejser privatsamleren sin samlings erstatningsunivers. Her bliver han så at sige Herre i eget hus. Her opnår han en ordnende kraft, der har kosmiske dimensioner. Ligesom Saturns tyngdekraft i kombination med de statistiske love om kollision i løbet af æonerne indfanger og ordner asteroider, meteoritter og omkringfarende brokker i lysende bånd rundt om planeten, på samme måde indfanger, ordner, stabiliserer og fikserer privatsamleren tingene med det formål at etablere en perfekt ligevægt mellem materialitet og identitet; som om det titaniske, planetare selv kun kan opretholdes med en perfekt organiseret ring af immobiliserede ting omkring sig. Det er, som samlerfilosofen Walter Benjamin skrev, "samlerens dybeste fortryllelse at lukke det enkeltstående ind i en magisk kreds, idet det stivner, mens et sidste gys (erhvervelsens gys) løber hen over det" (*Passageværket*, "Samleren" [H 1 a, 2]).

Heraf ser vi, at samleren ikke kun er en fetishistisk masturbant; han er også en tvangsneurotisk megaloman, der med sin organisering af tingene rejser fiktive universer. Af samme grund har samlinger ofte karakter af *modeller* – modeller af mulige, ideale verdener – og deler et af de karakteristiske træk ved modeller, nemlig *skalaen*. Ligesom arkitekturmodeller er nedskalerede versioner af kommende eller fiktive bygningsværker, på samme måde er samlinger nedskalerede versioner af potentielle universer; en verden *en miniature*, hvis inventar typisk bogføres i små bøger. Privatsamleren hengiver sig ofte til den slags mikrobureaugrafiske sysler, og lige så indlysende det er, at samleriet af natur er megalomant, lige så oplagt er det, at de fleste samlinger har indbygget et minima-princip, der ordner samlingen i stadigt mere kompakte former. Dette imploderende princip afbalancerer samleriets ekspansive

og inkluderende princip, selv om mange samlere har oplevet sidstnævnte tage magten, så samlingen flyder ud over alle breder, oversvømmes ejendommen og inddrager lader, udhuse, tilbyggede skure og overdækkede terrasser. Den ideale samling opretholder derimod en saturnisk balance mellem de imploderende og de ekspanderende kræfter.

Man vil (især hvis man bebor små lejligheder) genkende princippet fra bogreolen eller køkkenskabet, hvor enhver nyanskaffelse fordrer en samtidig bortskaffelse, hvorved samlingen gradvist forældes og organiseres mere og mere kompakt. I ideale samlinger, der ikke er underlagt køkkenskabets funktionskrav, medfører denne stadigt mere kompakte organisering undertiden en form for kvantespring for samlingen, når dens størrelse er formindsket så meget, at den bliver transportabel, f. eks. i en kuffert eller i en lomme. Samlingen bliver da, for nu at blive i de kosmiske metaforer, *en hvid dværg*, dvs. en kollapsede stjerne; et lysende objekt af umådelig massefylde men meget begrænset udstrækning. For de fleste samlingers vedkommende vil dette kvantespring markere sig som overgangen fra en stofbaseret til en immateriel tilstand, hvor samlingens oprindelige materielle genstande ændrer tilstandsform og bliver til data. Disse data kan naturligvis lagres på de sædvanlige måder, men kan også i den ideale form bæres i form af erindringer og viden, hvorved samlingen internaliseres i samlerens person. Benjamin noterede i den forbindelse, at samleri er "et urfænomen for det at studere: studenten samler viden" (*Passageværket* [H 4, 3]), og i forlængelse heraf kan man se grublere, lediggængere og dandyer som prototypiske eksempler på sådanne imploderede og internaliserede samlinger, der nu bæres til skue som lysende (og ofte aparte) adfærd. Dandyen er netop, som Baudelaire skriver et sted, *en sol der går under* – altså en imploderende stjerne.

* * *

Hvis det er korrekt, at ophobninger af ting på denne måde kan implodere under påvirkning af samlingens egen tyngdekraft og skifte tilstandsform til data, da bliver det påtrængende endnu engang at undersøge relationen mellem fysiske og semantiske objekter; ting og data; genstande og ord.

Den første præmis for vor undersøgelse vil være dén, at ting først bliver ting, når de navngives. Verdens materialitet samler sig således kun til betydningsfulde enheder, når sproget kalder dem ved navn. Vi antager altså, at der eksisterer en intim forbindelse mellem ting og ord, – en relation som kan udvides til en relation mellem ting og orden, fordi ordene har det med at klumpe sig sammen i betydningsdannende formationer, der etablerer systemer, strukturer og distinktioner, – altså orden. Det er sådanne relationer, vi i det følgende vil undersøge ved at opstille dét, som den amerikanske kunsthistoriker Rosalind Krauss i et berømt essay beskrev som et *udvidet felt* ("Sculpture in the Expanded Field", 1978)

Baggrunden for Krauss' essay var fremkomsten af nye, 'skulpturelle' kunstformer i 1970'erne som fx landart og installationiskunst; kunstformer som nok *lignede* traditionel skulptur ved at være rumlige og oftest med en stærk betoning af materialitet (selv om materialiteten nogle gange var negativ som i Heizers jordkunstværk *Double Negative*), men som alligevel, argumenterede Krauss, var *noget andet*. Nok var disse kunstformer rumlige og materielle, men det var en anden slags rumlighed og en anden slags materialitet end i den traditionelle skulptur, ligesom disse nye værkformer brød radikalt med monumentet, som havde været den konceptuelle matrice for skulptur i århundreder.

Hvis vi skifter ordet 'skulptur' ud med ordet 'ting' minder situationen i dag på nogle punkter om situationen i slutningen af 1970'erne, da Krauss skrev sit essay; ligesom dengang ser vi fremkomsten af nye ting-former, som nok ligner ting og fremvises som ting, men som alligevel er noget andet og fordrer nye samlings- og fremvisningsme-

toder. I det følgende vil vi derfor undersøge ting og samlinger ved hjælp af Krauss' metode, som via strukturalistisk teori er hentet fra matematikkens såkaldte Klein-gruppe, der kan forstås som en model for en strategisk ekspansion af en relation (her relationen Ting-Ord). Vi vil etablere et udvidet felt og på den måde søge at give navne til og kvalificere alternative ting og alternative strategier for omgangen med ting.

Første led i opstillingen af et udvidet felt er således at skitsere relationen mellem Ting og Ord(en) i en grafisk model, der også med det samme fortæller os, hvilken organiseringsform der hører til denne konstellation, nemlig museet:




FIG. 1

Som vi beskrev det indledningsvist, er museet karakteriseret ved at udspænde objekterne i spændingsfeltet mellem Ting og Ord. Den fetishisme, der hersker på museerne, henter sin fascinationskraft fra denne spænding. Som kunsthistorikeren Mieke Bal har udtrykt det, så "kommer den udstillede ting til at stå for noget andet, nemlig udsagnet om den; den kommer til at *betyde*. Tingen trækker sig tilbage i usynlighed, mens dens status som tegn træder i forgrunden for at etablere udsagnet." (Mieke Bal, *Double Exposures: The Subject of Cultural Analysis*). Tingen trækker sig dog aldrig helt tilbage bag tegnet. Snarere kunne man måske sige, at der på museet sker en form for 'æstetisk transsubstantiation'; altså en forvandling ligesom i nadveren, hvor oblåten ved præstens trylleformular bliver både brød og Kristi legeme.

Alle museumsskilte siger i virkeligheden det samme som præsten ved nadveren, nemlig "Dette er... (Jesu Kristi legeme)." De udpeger, at den udstillede ting ikke bare er 'noget', men at den på én gang er 'noget' og samtidig repræsenterer en i hvert fald halv-hellig betydning. Museer etablerer altså et mulighedsrum for sådan en paradoksal tilstandsform mellem Ting og Ord, men det vellykkede nadver-under afhænger naturligvis her som i kirken af et velvilligt publikum, der er indstillet på at acceptere spillets regler. En del 'mislykket' museumsformidling, hvor publikum ikke går oplyste og forklarede ud af de hellige haller, skyldes uden tvivl, at folkeviddet altid har nærret en sund skepsis over for de udpegende autoriteter (præstens latinske "Hoc est corpus meum" blev hurtigt til "Hokus pokus" ...).

Næste led i etableringen af det udvidede felt er vanskeligere, fordi det fordrer en tænkning i negationer og polære dobbeltheder, som vores mentale apparat har svært ved. For hvad er negationen af ting og orden? Heldigvis hjælper sproget os her med det lille ord 'ikke' eller med de mere mundrette begreber 'ingenting' og 'u-orden'. Vi kan således etablere det udvidede felts såkaldte *neuter-akse* på denne måde:




FIG. 2

Etableringen af dette udvidede felt hjælper os til at tænke relationen mellem ting og orden i mere komplekse relationer end dén, som kommer til udtryk når konkrete, fysiske ting ordnes (*ord-nes*), sådan som det

med størst kulturelt eftertryk kommer til udtryk på museet. Den logiske udvidelse af feltet udpeger nemlig, at der nødvendigvis må eksistere andre tilstandsformer, andre relationer mellem ting og orden og andre organiseringsformer i det udvidede felts øvrige kombinationer. I den grafiske fremstilling bliver det klart, at ligesom museet er stedet hvor Ting og Orden kombineres, på tilsvarende vis må der eksistere organiseringsformer for negationerne Ikke-Orden og Ikke-Ting. Modellen peger på, at sådanne negative kombinatorikker logisk må findes (eller tænkes at findes), men den svarer naturligvis ikke på, hvori de konkret består. Tilsvarende udpeger modellen eksistensen af kombinatorikker mellem den positive og den negative akse, nemlig venstresidens kombinatorik af Orden og Ikke-Orden og højresidens kombinatorik af Ting og Ikke-Ting, men heller ikke her giver modellen noget bud på, hvori disse kombinatorikker konkret består, den udpeger blot den logiske eksistens af disse kombinatorikker.

Et bud på disse spørgsmål, som samtidig vil være konklusionen på vor undersøgelse, er skitseret her:




FIG. 3


Som det fremgår af denne udfyldte version af det udvidede felt forekommer det oplagt at den organiseringsform, der mest præcist materialiserer relationen mellem Orden og Ikke-Orden, er *database*, ligesom vi vil foreslå *samlingen* som den organiseringsform, der materialiserer relationen mellem

THE PICCADILLY LINE


Ting og Ikke-Ting (jvf. de psykopatologiske karaktertræk ved privatsamleren skitseret ovenfor). Endelig vil vi foreslå den i akademiske sammenhænge endnu kun svagt udforskede kategori *An-samling* til at begrebsliggøre et organiseringsprincip svarende til relationen mellem Ikke-Orden og Ikke-Ting. En udfoldet analyse af disse begreber står endnu foran os og er ikke målet i nærværende sammenhæng. Her må de forenede kræfter fra forskningsfelter så forskellige som datalogi, digital æstetik, museologi, materiel kultur og psykologi træde til.

Vi mener med denne abstrakte model alene at have givet et bud på, hvordan man kan skelne generisk og logisk mellem forskellige måder at organisere ting på; en skelnen som kan vise sig frugtbar både i kulturanalytiske,

akademiske sammenhænge og i forhold til de mangfoldige kunstneriske praksisformer, der i disse år tager spørgsmålet om ting og samlinger op til fornyet debat. For når alt kommer til alt er også kunst jo et fænomen, der befinder sig i spændingsfeltet mellem ting og betydning. Etableringen af udvidede felter (og man kan forestille sig mange alternativer til denne version) antyder, at kunstens mulighed for at udfordre museernes traditionelle hegemoni måske befinder sig i helt andre logiske rum, end vi hidtil har forestillet os. En nutidig avantgarde behøver derfor ikke nødvendigvis rive museerne ned, men kan måske med fordel vende sig mod etableringen og den kritiske udforskning af positive alternativer til museet: samlinger, ansamlinger og databaser.



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
Sculpture in the Expanded Field

ROSALIND KRAUSS


Toward the center of the field there is a slight mound, a swelling in the earth, which is the only warning given for the presence of the work. Closer to it, the large square face of the pit can be seen, as can the ends of the ladder that is needed to descend into the excavation. The work itself is thus entirely below grade: half atrium, half tunnel, the boundary between outside and in, a delicate structure of wooden posts and beams. The work, *Perimeters/Pavilions/Decoys*, 1978, by Mary Miss, is of course a sculpture or, more precisely, an earthwork.

Over the last ten years rather surprising things have come to be called sculpture: narrow corridors with TV monitors at the ends; large photographs documenting country hikes; mirrors placed at strange angles in ordinary rooms; temporary lines cut into the floor of the desert. Nothing, it would seem, could possibly give to such a motley of effort the right to lay claim to whatever one might mean by the category of sculpture. Unless, that is, the category can be made to become almost infinitely malleable.


The critical operations that have accompanied postwar American art have largely worked in the service of this manipulation. In the hands of this criticism categories like sculpture and painting have been kneaded and stretched and twisted in an extraordinary demonstration of elasticity, a display of the way a cultural term can be extended to include just about anything. And though this pulling and stretching of a term such as sculpture is overtly performed in the name of vanguard aesthetics—the ideology of the new—its covert message is that of historicism. The new is made comfortable by being made familiar, since it is seen as having gradually evolved from the forms of the past. Historicism works on the new and different to diminish newness and mitigate difference. It makes a place for change in our experience by evoking the model of evolution, so that the man who now is can be accepted as being different from the child he once was, by simultaneously being seen—through the unseeable action of the telos—as the same. And we are comforted by this perception of sameness, this strategy for reducing anything foreign in either time or space, to what we already know and are.



*Mary Miss. Perimeters Pavillions Decoys. 1978.
(Nassau County, Long Island, New York.)*



No sooner had minimal sculpture appeared on the horizon of the aesthetic experience of the 1960s, than criticism began to construct a paternity for this work, a set of constructivist fathers who could legitimize and thereby authenticate the strangeness of these objects. Plastic? inert geometries? factory production?—none of this was *really* strange, as the ghosts of Gabo and Tatlin and Lissitzky could be called in to testify. Never mind that the content of the one had nothing to do with, was in fact the exact opposite of, the content of the other. Never mind that Gabo's celluloid was the sign of lucidity and intellection, while Judd's plastic-tinged-with-dayglo spoke the hip patois of California. It did not matter that constructivist forms were intended as visual proof of the immutable logic and coherence of universal geometries, while their seeming counterparts in minimalism were demonstrably contingent—denoting a universe held together not by Mind but by guy wires, or glue, or the accidents of gravity. The rage to historicize simply swept these differences aside.



Richard Serra. 5:30. 1969.

Of course, with the passing of time these sweeping operations got a little harder to perform. As the 1960s began to lengthen into the 1970s and "sculpture" began to be piles of thread waste on the floor, or sawed redwood timbers rolled into the gallery, or tons of earth excavated from the desert, or stockades of logs surrounded by firepits, the word *sculpture* became harder to pronounce—but not really that much harder. The historian/critic simply performed a more extended sleight-of-hand and began to construct his genealogies out of the data of millenia rather than decades. Stonehenge, the Nazca lines, the Toltec ballcourts, Indian burial mounds—anything at all could be hauled into court to bear witness to this work's connection to history and thereby to legitimize its status as sculpture. Of course Stonehenge and the Toltec ballcourts were just exactly *not* sculpture, and so their role as historicist precedent becomes somewhat suspect in this particular demonstration. But never mind. The trick can still be done by calling upon a variety of primitivizing work from the earlier part of the century—Brancusi's *Endless Column* will do—to mediate between extreme past and present.

But in doing all of this, the very term we had thought we were saving—*sculpture*—has begun to be somewhat obscured. We had thought to use a universal category to authenticate a group of particulars, but the category has now been forced to cover such a heterogeneity that it is, itself, in danger of collapsing. And so we stare at the pit in the earth and think we both do and don't know what sculpture is.

Yet I would submit that we know very well what sculpture is. And one of the things we know is that it is a historically bounded category and not a universal one. As is true of any other convention, sculpture has its own internal logic, its own set of rules, which, though they can be applied to a variety of situations, are not themselves open to very much change. The logic of sculpture, it would seem, is inseparable from the logic of the monument. By virtue of this logic a sculpture is a commemorative representation. It sits in a particular place and speaks in a symbolical tongue about the meaning or use of that place. The equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius is such a monument, set in the center of the Campidoglio to represent by its symbolical presence the relationship between ancient, Imperial Rome and the seat of government of modern, Renaissance Rome. Bernini's statue of the *Conversion of Constantine*, placed at the foot of the Vatican stairway connecting the Basilica of St. Peter to the heart of the papacy is another such monument, a marker at a particular place for a specific meaning/event. Because they thus function in relation to the logic of representation and marking, sculptures are normally figurative and vertical, their pedestals an important part of the structure since they mediate between actual site and representational sign. There is nothing very mysterious about this logic; understood and inhabited, it was the source of a tremendous production of sculpture during centuries of Western art.

But the convention is not immutable and there came a time when the logic began to fail. Late in the nineteenth century we witnessed the fading of the logic of

the monument. It happened rather gradually. But two cases come to mind, both bearing the marks of their own transitional status. Rodin's *Gates of Hell* and his statue of *Balzac* were both conceived as monuments. The first were commissioned in 1880 as the doors to a projected museum of decorative arts; the second was commissioned in 1891 as a memorial to literary genius to be set up at a specific site in Paris. The failure of these two works as monuments is signaled not only by the fact that multiple versions can be found in a variety of museums in various countries, while no version exists on the original sites—both commissions having eventually collapsed. Their failure is also encoded onto the very surfaces of these works: the doors having been gouged away and anti-structurally encrusted to the point where they bear their inoperative condition on their face; the *Balzac* executed with such a degree of subjectivity that not even Rodin believed (as letters by him attest) that the work would ever be accepted.

With these two sculptural projects, I would say, one crosses the threshold of the logic of the monument, entering the space of what could be called its negative condition—a kind of sitelessness, or homelessness, an absolute loss of place. Which is to say one enters modernism, since it is the modernist period of sculptural production that operates in relation to this loss of site, producing the monument as abstraction, the monument as pure marker or base, functionally placeless and largely self-referential.

It is these two characteristics of modernist sculpture that declare its status, and therefore its meaning and function, as essentially nomadic. Through its fetishization of the base, the sculpture reaches downward to absorb the pedestal into itself and away from actual place; and through the representation of its own materials or the process of its construction, the sculpture depicts its own autonomy. Brancusi's art is an extraordinary instance of the way this happens. The base becomes, in a work like the *Cock*, the morphological generator of the figurative part of the object; in the *Caryatids* and *Endless Column*, the sculpture is all base; while in *Adam and Eve*, the sculpture is in a reciprocal relation to its base. The base is thus defined as essentially transportable, the marker of the work's homelessness integrated into the very fiber of the sculpture. And Brancusi's interest in expressing parts of the body as fragments that tend toward radical abstractness also testifies to a loss of site, in this case the site of the rest of the body, the skeletal support that would give to one of the bronze or marble heads a home.


In being the negative condition of the monument, modernist sculpture had a kind of idealist space to explore, a domain cut off from the project of temporal and spatial representation, a vein that was rich and new and could for a while be profitably mined. But it was a limited vein and, having been opened in the early part of the century, it began by about 1950 to be exhausted. It began, that is, to be experienced more and more as pure negativity. At this point modernist sculpture appeared as a kind of black hole in the space of consciousness, something whose positive content was increasingly difficult to define, something that was possible to locate only in terms of what it was not. "Sculpture is what you bump into when

Auguste Rodin. Balzac. 1897.



Constantin Brancusi. Beginning of the World. 1924.


Robert Morris. *Green Gallery Installation*. 1964.
Untitled (Mirrored Boxes), 1965.



you back up to see a painting," Barnett Newman said in the fifties. But it would probably be more accurate to say of the work that one found in the early sixties that sculpture had entered a categorical no-man's-land: it was what was on or in front of a building that was not the building, or what was in the landscape that was not the landscape.


The purest examples that come to mind from the early 1960s are both by Robert Morris. One is the work exhibited in 1964 in the Green Gallery—quasi-architectural integers whose status as sculpture reduces almost completely to the simple determination that it is what is in the room that is not really the room; the other is the outdoor exhibition of the mirrored boxes—forms which are distinct from the setting only because, though visually continuous with grass and trees, they are not in fact part of the landscape.

In this sense sculpture had entered the full condition of its inverse logic and had become pure negativity: the combination of exclusions. Sculpture, it could be said, had ceased being a positivity, and was now the category that resulted from the addition of the *not-landscape* to the *not-architecture*. Diagrammatically expressed, the limit of modernist sculpture, the addition of the neither/nor, looks like this:



Now, if sculpture itself had become a kind of ontological absence, the combination of exclusions, the sum of the neither/nor, that does not mean that the terms themselves from which it was built—the *not-landscape* and the *not-*

architecture—did not have a certain interest. This is because these terms express a strict opposition between the built and the not-built, the cultural and the natural, between which the production of sculptural art appeared to be suspended. And what began to happen in the career of one sculptor after another, beginning at the end of the 1960s, is that attention began to focus on the outer limits of those terms of exclusion. For, if those terms are the expression of a logical opposition stated as a pair of negatives, they can be transformed by a simple inversion into the same polar opposites but expressed positively. That is, the *not-architecture* is, according to the logic of a certain kind of expansion, just another way of expressing the term *landscape*, and the *not-landscape* is, simply, *architecture*. The expansion to which I am referring is called a Klein group when employed mathematically and has various other designations, among them the Piaget group, when used by structuralists involved in mapping operations within the human sciences.* By means of this logical expansion a set of binaries is transformed into a quaternary field which both mirrors the original opposition and at the same time opens it. It becomes a logically expanded field which looks like this:




* The dimensions of this structure may be analyzed as follows: 1) there are two relationships of pure contradiction which are termed *axes* (and further differentiated into the *complex axis* and the *neuter axis*) and are designated by the solid arrows (see diagram); 2) there are two relationships of contradiction, expressed as involution, which are called *schemas* and are designated by the double arrows; and 3) there are two relationships of implication which are called *deixes* and are designated by the broken arrows.

For a discussion of the Klein group, see Marc Barbut, "On the Meaning of the Word 'Structure' in Mathematics," in Michael Lane, ed., *Introduction to Structuralism*, New York, Basic Books, 1970; for an application of the Piaget group, see A.-J. Greimas and F. Rastier, "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints," *Yale French Studies*, no. 41 (1968), 86-105.

Another way of saying this is that even though *sculpture* may be reduced to what is in the Klein group the neuter term of the *not-landscape* plus the *not-architecture*, there is no reason not to imagine an opposite term—one that would be both *landscape* and *architecture*—which within this schema is called the *complex*. But to think the complex is to admit into the realm of art two terms that had formerly been prohibited from it: *landscape* and *architecture*—terms that could function to define the sculptural (as they had begun to do in modernism) only in their negative or neuter condition. Because it was ideologically prohibited, the complex had remained excluded from what might be called the closure of post-Renaissance art. Our culture had not before been able to think the complex, although other cultures have thought this term with great ease. Labyrinths and mazes are *both* landscape and architecture; Japanese gardens are *both* landscape and architecture; the ritual playing fields and processions of ancient civilizations were all in this sense the unquestioned occupants of the complex. Which is *not* to say that they were an early, or a degenerate, or a variant form of sculpture. They were part of a universe or cultural space in which sculpture was simply another part—not somehow, as our historicist minds would have it, the same. Their purpose and pleasure is exactly that they are opposite and different.

The expanded field is thus generated by problematizing the set of oppositions between which the modernist category *sculpture* is suspended. And once this has happened, once one is able to think one's way into this expansion, there are—logically—three other categories that one can envision, all of them a condition of the field itself, and none of them assimilable to *sculpture*. Because as we can see, *sculpture* is no longer the privileged middle term between two things that it isn't. *Sculpture* is rather only one term on the periphery of a field in which there are other, differently structured possibilities. And one has thereby gained the "permission" to think these other forms. So our diagram is filled in as follows:






Robert Smithson. Spiral Jetty. 1969-70. (Photo Gianfranco Gorgoni.)


Robert Morris. Observatory. 1970.





Alice Aycock. Maze. 1972.

Carl Andre. Cuts. 1967.



It seems fairly clear that this permission (or pressure) to think the expanded field was felt by a number of artists at about the same time, roughly between the years 1968 and 1970. For, one after another Robert Morris, Robert Smithson, Michael Heizer, Richard Serra, Walter De Maria, Robert Irwin, Sol LeWitt, Bruce Nauman . . . had entered a situation the logical conditions of which can no longer be described as modernist. In order to name this historical rupture and the structural transformation of the cultural field that characterizes it, one must have recourse to another term. The one already in use in other areas of criticism is postmodernism. There seems no reason not to use it.

But whatever term one uses, the evidence is already in. By 1970, with the *Partially Buried Woodshed* at Kent State University, in Ohio, Robert Smithson had begun to occupy the complex axis, which for ease of reference I am calling *site construction*. In 1971 with the observatory he built in wood and sod in Holland, Robert Morris had joined him. Since that time, many other artists—Robert Irwin, Alice Aycock, John Mason, Michael Heizer, Mary Miss, Charles Simonds—have operated within this new set of possibilities.

Similarly, the possible combination of *landscape* and *not-landscape* began to be explored in the late 1960s. The term *marked sites* is used to identify work like Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970) and Heizer's *Double Negative* (1969), as it also describes some of the work in the seventies by Serra, Morris, Carl Andre, Dennis Oppenheim, Nancy Holt, George Trakis, and many others. But in addition to actual physical manipulations of sites, this term also refers to other forms of marking. These might operate through the application of impermanent marks—Heizer's *Depressions*, Oppenheim's *Time Lines*, or De Maria's *Mile Long Drawing*, for example—or through the use of photography. Smithson's *Mirror Displacements in the Yucatan* were probably the first widely known instances of this, but since then the work of Richard Long and Hamish Fulton has focused on the photographic experience of marking. Christo's *Running Fence* might be said to be an impermanent, photographic, and political instance of marking a site.

The first artists to explore the possibilities of *architecture* plus *not-architecture* were Robert Irwin, Sol LeWitt, Bruce Nauman, Richard Serra, and Christo. In every case of these *axiomatic structures*, there is some kind of intervention into the real space of architecture, sometimes through partial reconstruction, sometimes through drawing, or as in the recent works of Morris, through the use of mirrors. As was true of the category of the *marked site*, photography can be used for this purpose; I am thinking here of the video corridors by Nauman. But whatever the medium employed, the possibility explored in this category is a process of mapping the axiomatic features of the architectural experience—the abstract conditions of openness and closure—onto the reality of a given space.

The expanded field which characterizes this domain of postmodernism possesses two features that are already implicit in the above description. One of these concerns the practice of individual artists; the other has to do with the

question of medium. At both these points the bounded conditions of modernism have suffered a logically determined rupture.

With regard to individual practice, it is easy to see that many of the artists in question have found themselves occupying, successively, different places within the expanded field. And though the experience of the field suggests that this continual relocation of one's energies is entirely logical, an art criticism still in the thrall of a modernist ethos has been largely suspicious of such movement, calling it eclectic. This suspicion of a career that moves continually and erratically beyond the domain of sculpture obviously derives from the modernist demand for the purity and separateness of the various mediums (and thus the necessary specialization of a practitioner within a given medium). But what appears as eclectic from one point of view can be seen as rigorously logical from another. For, within the situation of postmodernism, practice is not defined in relation to a given medium—sculpture—but rather in relation to the logical operations on a set of cultural terms, for which any medium—photography, books, lines on walls, mirrors, or sculpture itself—might be used.

Thus the field provides both for an expanded but finite set of related positions for a given artist to occupy and explore, and for an organization of work that is not

Robert Smithson. First and Seventh Mirror Displacements, Yucatan. 1969.



dictated by the conditions of a particular medium. From the structure laid out above, it is obvious that the logic of the space of postmodernist practice is no longer organized around the definition of a given medium on the grounds of material, or, for that matter, the perception of material. It is organized instead through the universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within a cultural situation. (The postmodernist space of painting would obviously involve a similar expansion around a different set of terms from the pair *architecture/landscape*—a set that would probably turn on the opposition *uniqueness/reproducibility*.) It follows, then, that within any one of the positions generated by the given logical space, many different mediums might be employed. It follows as well that any single artist might occupy, successively, any one of the positions. And it also seems the case that within the limited position of sculpture itself the organization and content of much of the strongest work will reflect the condition of the logical space. I am thinking here of the sculpture of Joel Shapiro, which, though it positions itself in the neuter term, is involved in the setting of images of architecture within relatively vast fields (landscapes) of space. (These considerations apply, obviously, to other work as well—Charles Simonds, for example, or Ann and Patrick Poirier.)

Richard Long. Untitled. 1969. (Krefeld, Germany.)



I have been insisting that the expanded field of postmodernism occurs at a specific moment in the recent history of art. It is a historical event with a determinant structure. It seems to me extremely important to map that structure and that is what I have begun to do here. But clearly, since this is a matter of history, it is also important to explore a deeper set of questions which pertain to something more than mapping and involve instead the problem of explanation. These address the root cause—the conditions of possibility—that brought about the shift into postmodernism, as they also address the cultural determinants of the opposition through which a given field is structured. This is obviously a different approach to thinking about the history of form from that of historicist criticism's constructions of elaborate genealogical trees. It presupposes the acceptance of definitive ruptures and the possibility of looking at historical process from the point of view of logical structure.

*Joel Shapiro. Untitled (Cast Iron and Plaster Houses).
1975.*

